Balay Mindanaw Foundation, Inc.

Kaangayan, Kalambuan, Kalinaw ... sa Mindanaw, sa Pilipinas, sa Kalibutan

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I. The Mindanao Context

Mindanao, the “land of promise,” has long been known for conflict and violence from colonization up to the present. The people of Mindanao, most especially the indigenous peoples and the Moros, have been marginalized by the colonizers who came one after the other and further aggravated by resistance as well as revolt that arose across the centuries (Rodil, 2003). Though the political and administrative structures were gradually established later and became more stable after the Second World War, protests continued, especially in Mindanao, because of the growing dislocation, deprivation, landlessness and further marginalization of Moros and indigenous peoples. Though with little success, armed uprising went on even when the Philippines became independent in 1946. Since then, Mindanao has been a war zone characterized by the armed clashes between Moro bands and government forces (Gaspar, Lapad and Maravillas, 2002).

When President Marcos came into power, he took this Muslim rebellion as a reason to legitimize his declaration of Martial Law in 1972, which has resulted in enormous violence and abuses because of the power bestowed on the military. Victims were not just the Moros and the Lumads but also the Christians as well. These have strengthened the armed struggle against the government, which is still raging up to now. And the Moro provinces are among the country’s poorest (Llanto, 2008). The Moro people, including the indigenous communities, continue to be threatened by dislocation, abuses and marginalization because of armed conflict as well as land disputes or tenurial security issues resulting in food insecurity (Rodil, 2003). Violations of human rights largely happened when then President Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972 and started to inflict authoritarian rule.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) at that time fought each other strongly over the provinces of Mindanao. This war continued to give Marcos the authority of a “one-man rule” even with the growing facts of colossal human rights violations (Gaspar, Lapad and Maravillas, 2002).

The Mindanao conflict between the government and the insurgents was aggravated by the power of the succeeding civilian leadership, during their terms, in declaring “total war policy” by then Presidents Aquino and Ramos in 1988 and 1992, respectively, and the “all-out-war” by Estrada in 2000. President Arroyo’s silent war against the communist insurgents since Estrada was ousted in 2001 was formalized as “Oplan Tugis” in 2006 for the AFP with the target to eliminate the communist insurgency in the Philippines by 2010 (Valdez, 2008).

With the ongoing conflict and violence in Mindanao for almost four decades now, the AFP has made its official command to eliminate or neutralize the so-called “enemies of the state” (Calolo, 2006). Even with the civilian presidents who succeeded Marcos who claimed to have restored democracy after the fall of the dictatorship, their policies aggravated and supported the continuing internal war. The former Army chief, Lt. Gen. Romulo Yap, has related his assessment, in his very recent presentation during the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) of the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), that the government still fall short to win a victory over the insurgency, despite the growing number of body counts and firearms recovered (Juntereal, 2008).

This military institution has always been projecting itself as a war machine. In Mindanao alone, the Philippine Army has 4 infantry divisions, consisting of 46 battalions composed of 640 officers, 22,072 enlisted personnel and 32,593 armed volunteers of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographic Unit (CAFGU). They too are expected to maintain peace and order, engage in war yet most of the time not trying to solve the conflict, but rather creating more conflicts more than ever (BMFI, 2006). This is so because of the power they have maintained ever since they were trained to use it: the power of the gun. Soldiers were trained to fight and follow orders. These soldiers are always bound to abide by orders, thus becoming part of the problem. In the current administration, government security forces have been singled out as major violators of human rights (Gloria, 2007). Human Rights watch groups assert that killings (of civilian as well as activists) are being done with the military’s counterinsurgency program dubbed as Operation Plan Bantay Laya (Defend Freedom) that started in 2002 to destroy communist insurgents and Muslim bandits (Castaneda, 2006). This Oplan Bantay Laya, based on a primer developed by the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), is in accordance with the U.S. war on terror and patterned after the U.S. Military strategy that uses heavy weapons against those being considered enemies as terrorist (EMJP, 2006). The Macapagal-Arroyo administration got a $4.6 billion military and economic package in 2004 and a $30 million budget for anti-insurgency military exercises from the US Government (Castaneda, 2006).

In the report of the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) in the Philippines, the Philippine Army was responsible for the most number of cases of human rights abuses: 69% (Tuazon, 2002). Philippine National Police (PNP) and its mobile groups and special action forces got 18% while the hired goons, vigilante groups and other paramilitary forces got 13% (Tuazon, 2002). Furthermore, within 4 years (2001-2005), there was a total of 126, 885 victims whose rights were violated under the human rights law and the International Humanitarian Law (NDFP, 2005). Ninety percent (90%) comes from peasant relations and from Moro areas while 971 are direct victims; 45% of the direct victims were children, while 57% were males; and the military in general has the most number of victims: 86,859 victims (NDFP, 2005).

Balay Mindanaw’s engagement with the military in Mindanao through peace education aims to transform their culture of war into a culture of peace by providing tools in understanding conflict and presenting peaceful approaches as options in conflict management (BMFI, 2006). BMFI believes that the AFP’s approaches have to be challenged and can be transformed towards non-violent and peaceful ways, having their organization, the manpower, the facilities, logistics and discipline. BMFI realized the need to influence the military and strengthen its capacity to make peaceful interventions in the community. These changes will have impact on the on-going formal and local peace process in Mindanao.

BMFI has provided the necessary capacity building interventions to three Infantry Brigades under the 1st, 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions of the Southern Command. BMFI began with the training-workshops which were conducted with the help of resource partners from the academe and institutes. It was in 2006 that BMFI started to explore partnership with then 1st Infantry Division Commanding General Raymundo Ferrer for the trainings of his own officers and paramilitary personnel. Having witnessed the fast growing interest of a number of stakeholders in the military’s involvement towards a culture of peace, both parties have accepted each other’s trust, confidence and capability to make this undertaking possible. The general had seen the effects of the peace trainings in Basilan Province when he was still a brigade commander. When he became a division commander, he and his men (which his superiors approved and believed) were ready to undergo a capability program on conflict management and peace building, in partnership with Balay Mindanaw.

To date, BMFI has facilitated almost 10 batches of peace trainings with the military’s infantry divisions in Mindanao, including brigade and battalion levels. Dubbed as Operation Peace Course or OPKORS, these peace trainings were provided inside their camps and also at the Balay Mindanaw Peace Center which has the modest facilities for effective trainings. Focus was given to the enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers and paramilitary members of the army called the Citizen’s Armed Forces Geographical Units or CAFGUs. These CAFGUs are based in the barangays and relates closely with the communities living there making sure that peace prevails in the countryside. A training of trainors for the 103rd Brigade and recalls were also be conducted.

To date, Balay Mindanaw finds itself committed not only to the capacity building for conflict management and peace building for the Armed Forces but to contribute meaningfully to the Security Sector Reform of the Philippine Government.

The whole idea of a partnership for security reform started as individual initiatives of past brigade commanders and an NGO which was heavily involved in a peace process in Mindanaw. These were then considered by many as “isolated cases” of a well meaning and sincere effort to contribute to peace efforts in the troubled region of Mindanao. But these “isolated cases” were connected when the whole idea of Bridging Leadership was conceptualized by Prof. Ernesto Garilao of the Asian Institute of Management in 2004 together with Asian Institute of Management (AIM) and Mirant Corporation who was a major player in the power generation industry. Initially, it was Gen. Ben Dolorfino who attended a workshop and was encouraged to apply the concepts and useful tools of the bridging leadership to his Marine Brigade in the early part of the program in 2004. Months later, the first cohort of the Bridging Leadership Fellowship program began with Gen. Raymundo Ferrer and Ariel Hernandez of Balay Mindanaw Foundation, Inc. The two were classmates and became buddies in that program for the two years for 2004-2006. Through formal and informal discussions, the whole idea of connecting military, NGOs and Academe-based peace initiatives and models can be synthesized to build an alternative model that will pursue a reform in the security sector through capacity building on conflict management and peace building.

This concept was then consulted to the leadership of then Southern Command thru Maj. Gen. Gabriel Habacon in 2006, through the different commanders of the three infantry divisions and the marines, the brigade commanders, the NGOs involved in the peace process and peace advocacy, the Academe and even business sectors. This was with blessing and support from the Defense Department through a special order issued by then Sec. Avelino Cruz.

Since then, for almost three years now, with combined resources from those who believed in the meaningful innovation of pursuing peace advocacy even to the security sector, various capacity building activities were done at different levels.

The most recent was the capacity building for the Marine Corps under the leadership of now Commandant Maj. Gen. Ben Dolorfino. The momentum was temporarily suspended when rouge MILF attacked Lanao Norte towns thus triggering a shooting war in this conflict zone of Mindanaw. This was further aggravated by armed encounters in Basilan and Jolo.

General Ferrer is the newly installed Commanding General of the Eastern Mindanao Command (EastMinCom) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As the Commander, he practically covers 2/3 of the whole Mindanao Region composed of 4th Infantry Division, 6th Infantry Division and 10th Infantry Division, Air Force and Naval forces covering 20 out of the 29 provinces in Mindanao.

Being a visionary and a staunch advocate of conflict management and peace building in the sector he represents, this is the most opportune time to pursue, with passion and with enough influence, the capacity building program piloted and mainstreamed three years ago and now possibly with a strong component of policy advocacy in order to make a significant contribution to the security sector reform of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

There will be some adjustments in the program as the whole landscape now presents different realities, different players and other issues in the eastern Mindanao command area of operation.

A working document entitled “a framework on engaging the Armed Forces of the Philippines towards a meaningful security sector reform” captures the learning and reflections of the advocates of this program for the past three years. Balay Mindanaw took the initiative to put this into a document not as a final document but as a working paper to guide the discussion with players, supporters and policy makers.

The capacity building will focus on three levels:

• For senior officers – this will only be for two days as senior officers, Battalion commanders and brigade commanders cannot be absent in their respective area of responsibility for more than three days.
   
• Junior Officers- this will be for five days covering a full course run by Balay Mindanaw in the last three years with junior officers. Some of the junior officers will also be trained as trainors to do re-echo sessions of the topics in their respective battalions, companies and units.
   
• NCOs – just like the junior officers, the non-commissioned officers who are at the forefront of the action to make or break the peacebuilding efforts in the communities, will also undergo 5-days seminar workshop on conflict management and peacebuilding. A trainors training will also be given to a selected NCOs who will act as multipliers of the capacity building to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs).

To effectively run the training for the NCOs on conflict management and peacebuilding, the program will invest in training at least 20 personnel from the Division Training Units of the three Army Divisions who runs regular retraining courses for all the NCOs in the respective infantry divisions.

Field Monitoring both by the Division and Area Command personnel will be regularly conducted to assess the effect and impact of the capacity building program both at the personal, unit and community level.

Random semestral recall for chosen personnel will also be conducted to assess the impact of the program at the personal level and to find how to improve the design of the program.

The objective of the policy advocacy is twofold. First, it seeks to mainstream the conflict and management courses to the formal academic institutions of the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces, to name a few, the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), General Staff College (GSC), the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). Other schools of the armed forces that are of equal importance for mainstreaming are the Philippine Army Civil Military School, Training and Doctrine Command School. These schools mould the young minds of the future leader of the security sector of this country. By making sure that such conflict management and peacebuilding modules will be incorporated in their curriculum, the program will achieve a lasting impact on the minds and heart of the soon to be policy makers and operational commanders of the security sector.

The 2nd objective of the policy advocacy of this program is admittedly difficult but workable under a favorable environment. This is to attempt to change the doctrine of the basis of promotion for the soldiers. Presently, the basis of promotion is focus on two major areas, that is enemies captured or killed and firearms surrendered or captured. These two indicators are without doubt developed in a war era but were never added nor challenged in a fast changing world like what we have today.

An impact assessment of the capacity building will be conducted to determine the impact of the capacity building program implemented over the last three years. The output of which will be utilized as a learning material for the whole institution of the Armed Forces and will become the basis for policy changes in two important aspects, the basis for promotion and institutionalization of the courses in the various academic and training institutions under the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

This will be done thru policy dialogue among the operations and policy level of the armed forces and the department of defense, roundtable conferences, peace policy writing, publication and media exposure. To ensure ownership and commitment to the reform agenda for the security sector, key stakeholders of peace and development like the LGUs, the leaders of Bishop-Ulama Conference, the Mindanao Business Council,

For the next twelve months the following targets shall have been achieved:

Champions Development: 

• At least 150 of brigade, battalion commanders and executive officers undergo a two-day orientation seminar on conflict management and peacebuilding
• At least 300 junior officers, company commanders and CMO officers undergo a 4-day conflict management and peacebuilding seminar with clear re-entry plan on their way back to their area of operation
• At least 3 trainors training of five days representing three divisions as the multiplier champions of the program composed of 20 junior officers per division

Institutional Development:

• Training for DTU

Before, we conduct special trainings for the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who are frontliners in the field, the program will instead invest in developing the capacity of the Division Training Units whose mandate is to train and re-train soldiers. This will be more cost effective and second it will be a start of the institutionalization process of the program at the division level.

• Curriculum Development

A curriculum development will be designed, pilot tested and implemented in the three division training units (DTU) under the EastMinCom. This will only be possible after at least 20 personnel per DTU have undergone a customize orientation and trainors training on conflict management. Such process will ensure that a curriculum that will be mainstreamed in the DTU will also be fully understood, appreciated and can be rightfully re-echoed to soldiers with same level of commitment and passion to their superiors and partners.
Effectively, by mainstreaming the program to the DTUs of the respective infantry divisions, the program will directly influence at least 40 NCOs per month per DTU or about 1200/DTU/Year or a total of 3600 NCO every for 1year. 

For the first three months, the program will invest on Impact Assessment together with chosen case studies and monographs for the previous initiatives to determine the impact of the previous capacity-building program on conflict management and peacebuilding in three levels, namely the personal level, the organizational level and community level.

Round Table Policy Discussion

These workshops will be pursued as they were possibly done in 2007 where key senior and junior officers met some of their top leadership to share, listen and discuss learnings and possible plans which can be done with other key stakeholders. This time the policy discussions will be more substantive as case studies, monographs and an impact assessment will an important input to the discussions along with the key stakeholders.

A policy writer preferably from the Office of the Strategic Studies or from any Defense establishment will be hired to write the complete policy paper that will be submitted to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and to the Secretary of the National Defense.

The main output is a policy paper to mainstream peace courses in the academic institutions run by the Department of National Defense and the education units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and a policy paper to insitutionalize a promotion system among the men and women in the Armed Forces involved in peace promotions and creating and strengthening mechanisms local conflict resolution apart from the usual body count and firearms captured or surrendered as the only basis for promotion.

As a wrap up and synthesis of the program, a forum will be organized and will be aired thru ANC with the presence of DND officials, Division Commanders, Brigade Commanders, NGO partners, BUC Leaders, Mindanao Business Council and the LGU Leaders.