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Sendong
relief work in Cagayan de Oro
Ignoring international humanitarian standards yet another disaster?
By Bibing Mordeno, 25 January 2012
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| Bibing at a
newly pitched tent in Barangay Indahag. |
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It was in the wee hours of 17
December 2011 that I witnessed the whirling and whistling winds
ravaging part of the ceiling of our family dwelling, even if there
did not seem to be that much rain. Not only once nor twice, but
several text messages came in from Kaloy forwarding the hotlines of
the 4th Infantry Division (4ID), and informing me how colleagues had
rescued some families of fellow Balay Mindanaw workers. He also
requested everyone at risk to relocate as quickly as possible to the
Peace Center for safety. At the same time, his words helped to
strengthen my mind and spirit and to keep calm but also vigilant...
for my three little ones, and the other family members. Dodong wasn’t
with us that very tragic night. It was only in the morning that I
realized the truly devastating effects of Sendong – the loss of
lives and the missing family members, some swept into the sea as far
as Camiguin and even Misamis Occidental, the countless injuries and
the scars that unfortunately will haunt everyone who survived that
night of disaster.
Based on the report of the
weather bureau PAGASA stationed in El Salvador City, Typhoon Sendong
was the 19th tropical atorm that entered the Philippine area of
responsibility and the 2nd tropical storm that affected Mindanao in
2011.
PAGASA cited that in general,
the destruction it caused in the cities of Cagayan de Oro and Iligan
was due to the widespread excessive rains associated with strong
winds – severely affecting communities living near the riverbanks,
mountain slopes, and flood prone areas, especially those at the
downstream portion of the rivers. Most deaths were caused by the
sudden rise of floodwaters, spilling over from the river channels
and bringing with them flowing mud, uprooted trees of various kinds
and logs from the mountains that were carried away by the deluge of
flowing water.
Around 70,528 families or
388,836 persons were reported to be affected, distributed throughout
184 barangays within the provinces of Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon,
and the cities of Cagayan de Oro and Iligan. The number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside the evacuation centers
reached around 4,870 families or 22,868 individuals, with another
34,955 families or 197,480 persons staying wherever they could
outside the evacuation centers. The number of houses damaged in
Cagayan de Oro, Bukidnon and Iligan reached 38,771 with 11,218
partially damaged and 27,553 totally damaged. As regards the number
of casualties, 1,388 persons are now reported dead, but only 871
have actually been identified; 1,992 have been reported injured. All
these in the locations of Cagayan de Oro, Iligan, Bukidnon, Misamis
Oriental, Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga del Norte.
When the office decided to
transform itself into a disaster response institution within 48
hours of the event, and with Kaloy’s guidance, we found ourselves
involved in all sorts of tasks, despite the continuing demands of
our everyday jobs before Sendong.
Balay Mindanaw has
transformed itself into a relief provider. Almost spontaneously we
found we were able to create the following major teams: resource
mobilization and relief distribution (giving out incredible amounts
of food and non-food items). Before we knew it, we had developed
links with the regional office of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), the Disaster Response Multi-sectoral Group
of CDO headed by the DSWD Regional Director Araceli F. Solamillo and
Archbishop Antonio Ledesma. As the interventions proceeded, the
teams for psycho-social services; water, sanitation and hygiene; and
shelter evolved.
One outstanding personal
experience for me, as a neophyte to disaster response, was my
hands-on training with the team from Disaster Aid International
(DAI) with Ed Cox as the team leader, along with his colleagues Hans
and Dave, who had flown in to facilitate the installation of 100
family-sized tents for people urgently needing shelter.
When we asked Ed to share
with us some of the basics of disaster response, he said that, as
far as possible, setting up transitional shelters is not usually
encouraged. Many times this can result in increased social problems,
including congestion, shortages or poor access to food and water
supplies, heightened risks of communicable diseases and poor
nutrition, most particularly among children, the elderly and persons
with disability. But in the case of Cagayan de Oro, we just had no
choice because there were so many people needing some place to stay
as soon as possible. An extended stay in grossly over-crowded
evacuation centers (which are often simply covered basketball
courts) was going to be worse!
So many of us from civil
society organizations, local government offices, as well as from
religious groups, are entirely new to the massive impact of a
disaster like Sendong. Maybe it was because we found ourselves at
the heart of a number of really intense and taxing conflicts. First
off, we had to deal with a “first in-first out policy” on
getting tents from DSWD’s storage; we also had to manage
influential, but well-meaning people who, without malice, just
wanted to help de-clog the classrooms being used as evacuation
centers. The problem with the latter was not the intention but the
fact that it was being done without enough preparation and joint
planning so as to ensure the sustained and regular assistance to
families that were being moved on to other sites. Meantime, there
was a proliferation of groups doing profiling and surveys,
overloaded the survivors with numerous interviews so that those
groups could employ their own “disaster management tools” or
fill in their matrices. That, and the annoying dominance of some
groups who depict themselves as “experts” in disaster response
– all the while ignoring, even if not quite deliberately, the “short
cuts” they employed in facilitating community processes.
It was the DAI that stressed
to us the importance of knowing what risks may be encountered before
coming up with any decisions pertaining to the survivors. It made us
realize the importance of having an inventory of support groups and
their programs and services, which I later came to know as the 3Ws: who
does what where? The question was also posed as to
whether we were providing the right aid to the right people, a
question that Kaloy kept telling us was crucial, explaining that
Balay Mindanaw can only do so much. This triggered my senses. And
finally, being asked whether our interventions would result in
making the lives of the IDPs better than they were before or whether
we were just coping with the situation, left me in silence. What I
know is this: the learning has been massive and rapid, and there is
little difference between the criteria we should apply here and the
criteria of effectiveness we employ in our Reflecting on Peace
Practice (RPP).
There are international
humanitarian (SPHERE’s) standards: such as 3.5 square meters as
minimum floor space per person, or 20 persons per classroom, 15
liters of water per person per day, 1 latrine per 20 persons or for
one family, also ensuring that the new or temporary dwellings are
accessible to major transportation and communication facilities. The
standards also include the layout of tents so that there is adequate
space between houses, as well as access roads, spaces for children
to play, spaces for women (lactating/breastfeeding, bathing,
washing), and the first expiry-first out as to disposal of food
supply. When consciously applied, such standards ensure that no
further harm can come to the IDPs. Such standards, however, have not
been strictly observed during the interventions of the last 40 days.
Are the international
standards just guides to consider or should they be strictly adhered
to so that we can be sure that further disaster will not befall the
worst affected? Is there really an argument that can justifiably say
we should “contextualize” these humanitarian standards? Or is
that just an excuse for an inexcusable compromise? Am I just too
idealistic in saying these should be non-negotiables, and that it is
our responsibility as local CSOs to establish the culture of
adhering to these standards, that these should established as norms,
that these should not be broken by simply invoking the word “context”?
I salute the dedication and
loving compassion of a number of groups and individuals who
consistently extended whatever support they could to help our
affected brothers and sisters. Personally, I would like to thank
Balay Mindanaw for the stock knowledge (especially on conflict
transformation) and for the institution’s continuing passion to be
with the most vulnerable sectors and groups in our society.
In closing, my love and
prayers for the healing of the survivors, for those lives lost, for
those until now are still missing, and for those who still suffer
from fatal injuries. Quoting Archbishop Ledesma in his open
invitation to the 40th day (Kuarenta Dias) after Sendong, he said,
“This is also to remind us of our interconnectedness with nature,
to awaken the call in each of us to unite and love the river, to
respect its nurturing power and to make it life-giving again through
our struggle to participate in its protection….”
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